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Abstract 
 
The social sciences in general and educational researchers in particular have 
become more and more conscious of ethical propriety and the need for universally 
acceptable codes of ethical conduct in recent years. This newfound interest stems 
in part from criticisms of innovative contemporary research methodologies, and 
the fear that they may be at odds with certain fundamental ethical principles. This, 
in turn, has resulted in the integrity and validity of some of these new 
contemporary styles of research being held up to scrutiny and debated by 
adherents to the more conventional research methodologies. 
 
This paper begins by tracing back to the origins of ethical philosophy in an 
attempt to put in perspective the underlying principles behind the rules governing 
ethical behaviour, and what exactly we mean by the term today. The application of 
these principles to rules governing sound ethical research practice is reviewed 
from both an epistemological and ontological perspective. Some contemporary 
methodologies (namely, covert research, ethnographic studies and action research) 
are defined and interpreted with a view to reviewing their compliance or otherwise 
with the accepted principles of ethical practice within the field of research. 
 
Finally, conclusions are drawn from the matters alluded to within the paper with a 
view to reconciling some of the inherent ethical inconsistencies that appear to 
exist. Definitive answers are not proffered, as the author believes that no definitive 
answers are possible, merely prescriptive contingent discriminations to resolve the 
current impasse. 
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Introduction 
 
The need to ensure that the practice of research within the social sciences is based 
on sound ethical principles is not open to debate. Such principles are essential in 
order to ensure that conclusions drawn from research are valid and that the 
integrity of the methodology used in arriving at these conclusions is beyond 
reproach. But what exactly are these principles, where did they originate from, 
who should safeguard them, and how can they be policed? 
There is growing concern within the field of educational research that 
contemporary approaches to methodology subvert certain ethical principles and, as 
a result, bring the entire educational research discipline into disrepute. This paper 
attempts to analyse the origin and importance of ethics within the field of 
educational research. The ethical principles that we have come to expect of 
researchers are reviewed and commented on, drawing from the current literature 
and luminaries on this topic. Immanuel Kant’s contribution to this debate is 
reviewed in light of some of the contemporary approaches to research 
methodology that are now in vogue within the field of educational research. 
This paper does not attempt to answer all the questions that arise within the topic 
discussed, nor does it attempt to resolve all the apparent inconsistencies that 
appear to be irreconcilable. The objective of this paper is to reflect on the main 
issues, as the author perceives them, and to draw conclusions as to how some of 
the more contemporary approaches to research methodology can coexist with the 
traditional methodologies while at the same time ensuring that their techniques 
reflect the sound ethical standards that will retain the integrity essential for their 
continued acceptance and intrinsic validity. 
 
1. The philosophy of ethics 
 
I do not believe in the immorality of the individual, and I 
consider ethics to be an exclusively human concern without any 
superhuman authority behind it. 
Albert Einstein (1879-1955) 
 
Before examining ethical behaviour and the topical issues pertaining to the 
subject, it is probably best at this juncture to briefly explain what exactly we mean 
4
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by ‘ethics’. The very nature of moral philosophy or ‘ethics’ is such that its very 
definition gives rise to much heated dialectical debate. That said however, it is 
important to attempt to define this field within the context of this paper, but bear 
in mind that no definition will find universal approval. 
Fieser and Dowden, (2004) in their Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, offer 
the following definition: they assert that ‘The field of ethics, also called moral 
philosophy, involves systematizing, defending, and recommending concepts of 
right and wrong behaviour’. 
Marshall (1998), in his Dictionary of Sociology, attempts the following definition: 
‘Ethics is often defined as the concern with what ought to be, whereas science 
(including social science) is concerned with describing reality as it actually exists’. 
He goes on to state that social science should be ‘value free’ or ‘value neutral’. He 
acknowledges however, that the practice of social science investigation (both the 
means and goals) is ‘intrinsically bound up with ethical considerations’. 
As pointed out by Raphael (1980: 1) in the introduction of his book Moral 
Philosophy, ‘the main purpose of philosophy, as practised in the Western tradition, 
is the critical evaluation of assumptions and arguments’. He goes on to point out 
that all societies and cultural groups tend to simply accept ‘without question’, 
beliefs and conventions inherent within those societies. Raphael (1980) uses the 
example of the beliefs held by primitive tribes or societies believing in witchcraft 
to highlight the point that some societies believe in things far removed from the 
mainstream current Western belief system. The point is well made and accentuates 
one of the fundamental purposes of philosophy, which is to examine all of our 
underlying assumptions and inherited beliefs, and to consider whether we have 
good reason to follow them. It may well be that we have: but at least we will have 
used reason and self-reflection to give personal meaning to what we believe in. If 
however, we find that we cannot support the underlying assumptions, then we 
must either suspend judgement or else find a new framework of belief. 
Questioning traditional assumptions that underlie our culture, and the ability to 
reach new ones is part of the evolution of humankind. It is the ability to do this 
that has enabled humankind to progress to the level that we have, and is one of the 
key characteristics that differentiates us from all other animals. Philosophy has 
greatly assisted this process. 
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Philosophical analysis today tends to refer to a loose family of practices, or styles 
that maintain a dedication to consistency, clarity, rigour, some degree of 
scepticism and a careful examination of language to assist us in being more adept 
in understanding important aspects of our lives and the nature of humankind as a 
social animal. 
Each and every one of us that is capable of rational thought, to some degree has 
engaged, whether consciously or unconsciously in philosophical thoughts. It 
should be remembered that the term ‘philosophy’ is made up of two Greek words, 
namely, philo- meaning love of and sophos- meaning wise. This point is 
mentioned to help us understand the nature of philosophy and what it ultimately 
stands for. 
 
Although the terms ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ tend to be used interchangeably as 
synonyms, it is important to point out that there is a technical difference within the 
field of philosophy. Namely, ‘moral’ or ‘morality’ is a broad descriptive term. In 
the philosophical literature, the most general term for the consideration of what we 
ought to do, think, feel or be is ‘ethics’. The term ‘morality’ in philosophical 
literature refers to a subset of ethics that notably came to prominence in Europe, 
and which focuses on our obligations and what is right. That being said however, 
no such distinction will be made in this paper, and both terms will be used 
interchangeably to include the broad and narrow sense outlined. 
Philosophy, in all matters attempts to be rational and in this regard it shares a 
common objective with science. Raphael makes an interesting point in describing 
how philosophy differs from science when he notes: 
the practitioner of a particular science is not so likely to see, or to 
be able to cope with, apparent inconsistencies between two 
general fields of science ... or between his field of science and 
some other well-established body of thought. 
(Raphael 1980: 6) 
 
The philosopher by his or her nature must adopt an overall view on a topic of 
analysis relative to all of the components of reality. This is sometimes referred to 
as a ‘helicopter view’ in that the philosopher must rise above any given situation 
and view the full picture in a holistic, thorough and concise manner. Questions 
must be answered, but answers must be questioned. The philosopher will question 
6
Level 3, Vol. 3 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://arrow.tudublin.ie/level3/vol3/iss1/2
DOI: 10.21427/D73M9R
Level3 – May 2005 – Issue 3 
© Greg Gallagher, Dublin Institute of Technology 
 
matters both epistemologically (how we know what we know) and ontologically 
(the way we understand the world). This distinction is important and is a key 
determining differentiation between the scientist and the philosopher. 
 
According to Guthrie, ‘moral and political philosophy first arose in Greece (which 
means that it first arose in Europe) in an atmosphere of scepticism’ (1978: 67). 
This scepticism is explained by Guthrie (1978), as a mistrust of the possibility of 
absolute knowledge. Prior to the arrival of Socrates (469-399 BC), Plato (c.429-
347 BC) and Aristotle (384-322 BC) (Guthrie 1978: 67 refers to these three 
individuals as the greatest of the Greek philosophers), theories of physical science 
attempted to explain everything that was capable of being explained. After all, the 
foundations of physical science were based on immutable laws, which gave 
stability and permanence. The public however, reacted to this arrogance and the 
choice, as Guthrie (1978: 65) infers, of either accepting the theories of Parmenides 
[who advanced the view that non-existence was impossible, that everything was 
permanently in a state of being] or the atomists [who believed that everything had 
a materialist explanation]. This in turn gave rise to a more humanistic approach to 
explain reality as proffered by the itinerant teachers of the day called Sophists. 
Around the second half of the fifth century BC according to Guthrie (1978: 68), an 
Athenian called Archelaus; a pupil of Anaxagoras is reputed to have made the link 
between material laws and moral laws. Guthrie, describes this rational moral link 
as follows: 
If hot and cold, sweet and bitter, have no existence in nature but are simply a 
matter of how we feel at the time, then, it was argued, must we not suppose 
that justice and injustice, right and wrong, have an equally subjective and 
unreal existence? There can be in nature no absolute principles governing the 
relations between man and man. It is all a question of how you look at it. 
(Guthrie 1978: 68) 
 
Almost two and a half thousand years later and some would argue that nothing has 
really been added to this interpretation. However, others would assert that the 
argument has been augmented and refined taking into account the various 
doctrines and schools of thought that exist within the field of ethical philosophy – 
intuitionism, naturalism, emotive theory, moral psychology, psychological 
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egoism, existentialism, utilitarianism to name just a very small number of the 
myriad of those that exist. 
 
The ethical debate received many contributions during the twentieth century, a 
period that saw the birth of many social sciences, which sought recognition in 
their own right as autonomous bodies of knowledge. The social sciences were also 
intertwined with ethics and the ethical debate predominantly as it affected the 
realm of research within their fields. How could the social sciences ensure that 
their integrity and valuable contributions would not be compromised by research, 
which was deemed to be unethical? 
We must now look at the impact that ethical theory had on the social sciences and 
educational research in particular. 
 
 
 
2. Ethics and social research 
 
Science cannot resolve moral conflicts, but it can help to 
more accurately frame the debates about those conflicts. 
(Heinz Pagels, The Dreams of Reason (1988)) 
 
The origins of concerns about research ethics are to be found in medical research, 
but this has broadened to include all research with human subjects. It is interesting 
to note that Marshall, in his Dictionary of Sociology, defines ‘research ethics’ very 
comprehensively and succinctly. For him research ethics consists of: 
The application of moral rules and professional codes of conduct to the 
collection, analysis, reporting, and publication of information about research 
subjects, in particular active acceptance of subjects’ right to privacy, 
confidentiality and informed consent. 
(Marshall 1998: 566) 
 
He goes on to state that until only recently both sociologists, and social scientists 
generally, often displayed ‘arrogance’ in their treatment of research subjects and 
justified this approach on the grounds that it was necessary to uncover the truth. 
Marshall (1998: 566) points out that this trend is now being addressed within 
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industrialized societies by the adoption of formal codes of conduct and greater 
emphasis on ethical research procedures. The point is made by Marshall that: 
Public opinion now resists invasions of privacy for genuine research 
purposes just as much as for publicity seeking mass media stories, as 
evidenced by periodic increases in survey non-response, despite the fact that 
anonymity is effectively guaranteed in large-scale data collections. 
(Marshall 1998: 566) 
 
The importance that ethics now has within the field of social science is evidenced 
by the array of books devoted totally to the subject of ethics both for research 
students in general, for example Oliver (2003) and educational researchers 
specifically, for example McNamee and Bridges (2002) and Sikes et al. (2003) to 
name just two. Published books, solely devoted to the topic of ethics within these 
fields would not have been available several years ago as demand would not 
perhaps have justified their indulgence. It is interesting to note that such is the 
proliferation of ethics within the social sciences that the Illinois Institute of 
Technology has a Centre for the Study of Ethics in the Professions, and offers 
codes of ethics online (see Illinois Institute of Technology 2004). This point both 
elucidates and is testament to the recent increase in interest in ethics within the 
sphere of social research. 
As Christians points out: ‘The theory and practice of mainstream social science 
reflect liberal Enlightenment philosophy, as do education, science and politics’ 
(2000: 135). Under the subtitle - Codes of Ethics – Christians informs us that: ‘By 
the 1980s, each of the major scholarly associations had adopted its own code, with 
an overlapping emphasis on four guidelines for directing an inductive science of 
means toward majoritarian ends’ (2000: 138). Christians (2000: 138-140) goes on 
to tell us and explain in detail what these four guidelines are, namely: 
1. Informed consent 
a. Subjects must agree voluntarily to participate 
b. This agreement must be based on full and open information 
2. Deception 
? Deliberate misrepresentation is forbidden 
3. Privacy and confidentiality 
? Primary safeguard against unwanted exposure 
? Made public only behind a shield of anonymity 
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? No one deserves harm or embarrassment as a result of insensitive 
research practices 
4. Accuracy 
 
Apart from this fourth guideline, which Christians (2000: 140) deems ‘cardinal’, he 
explains circumstances in which each of the other three guidelines can be breached, 
and are breached with some element of justifiable entitlement. 
Christians goes on to inform us, under the subtitle –Institutional Review Boards – 
that where government funding is sought for research purposes, certain conditions 
are also put in place: ‘Three principles, published in what became known as the 
Belmont Report, were said to constitute the moral standards for research involving 
human subjects: respect for persons, beneficence, and justice’ (2000: 140-141). To 
some degree these principles reiterate the guidelines outlined above and this point is 
acknowledged by Christians (2000: 140). 
 
If it is the case, as it appears to be, that many of the principles, guidelines, codes, 
procedures and policies do not have universal approval, and if by strict enforcement 
of ethical standards we restrict the freedom of researchers to uncover truth which in 
turn assists us in understanding our world, how can we ensure that ethical standards 
will be upheld and that research findings can be relied upon? 
Perhaps the answer to this question is a bit like the unanswerable religious question 
– we must have faith. But faith in what or faith in whom? The answer to this 
question might be explained in the term ‘value judgement’, so let us now look at 
exactly what we understand by this term, which is in itself imbued with meaning. 
 
3 Value judgements 
 
To spend too much time in studies is sloth; to use them too much 
for ornament, is affectation; to make judgement wholly by their 
rules is the humour of a scholar. 
(Francis Bacon (1561-1626), Essays 1, ‘Of Studies’) 
 
In all of our lives we have choices to make between and among competing values. 
This is what ethics is about, and what distinguishes ethics as a theory of decision-
10
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making from morality, which concerns right and wrong, not `right' from `right'. As 
May explains: ‘Value judgements are dependent on beliefs and experiences in 
everyday life. They also concern what we would like our experience to be’ (2001: 
49). 
In attempting to understand morals we must view them as rules, effectively 
describing desirable and undesirable states. They describe right and wrong. Ethics 
effectively represent the rules for deciding how (desirable and undesirable) states 
are to be achieved or avoided. Ethics are, in essence, rules for making rules of 
conduct and action. That is, ethics are not codified in laws or nursery rhymes; they 
are principles or civic virtues that guide how we will choose between and among 
different values. They give us flexibility, with limits. To be effective, therefore, 
ethics must have a centrality based on a rational understanding of the ‘common 
good’. Sauer defines the common good in the following way: 
The common good, by definition, goes beyond material, instrumental, or 
utilitarian forms of co-operation, because it embraces far more than the 
common goals produced by such patterns of co-operation, namely, the kind 
of community, the civility or civic temperament, brought into being and 
sustained through these patterns of interaction and co-operation, which is the 
goal of civic life. Viewed in this manner the common good is the normative 
dynamic of the way of life of a community, conditioned by and conditioning 
the growth and replacement of the structures and systems of socio-co-
operative existence. 
(Sauer 1997: 1184) 
But what exactly are virtues and values that will maintain the common good? 
Virtue theory, which is one of the oldest normative traditions in Western 
philosophy, has its roots in ancient Greek civilization. Plato emphasized four 
virtues in particular, which were later called cardinal virtues: wisdom, courage, 
temperance and justice. Other important virtues are fortitude, generosity, self-
respect, good temper, and sincerity. In addition to advocating good habits of 
character, virtue theorists hold that we should avoid acquiring bad character traits, 
or vices, such as cowardice, insensibility, injustice, and vanity. Virtue theory 
emphasizes moral education since virtuous character traits are developed in one's 
youth. Adults, therefore, are responsible for instilling virtues in the young. 
Individual ethics can only be understood when they are juxtaposed with the 
society within which they are practised. Therefore by extraction we can deduce 
that individual ethical behaviour is far more likely to flourish within a just and 
equitable society. It might be argued that in order to lead an ethical life one must 
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work to build a just society, which forms our values even as we shape its 
structures. 
As Sauer notes: 
Most of our self-understanding as civic, communal selves has lapsed into a 
positivistic, utilitarian idiom in which only `hard' and `realistic' assumptions 
about human nature are allowed. In this idiom, human action is likened to a 
game in where each player is trying to maximize his or her self-interest or is 
concerned only with the quid quo pro in an exchange network. But there is 
evidence, if inadequately assessed, that this paradigm is incomplete. Human 
beings are indeed selves capable of interaction with others to express what a 
good person in a good society ought to be. This is the realm of public 
philosophy that inextricably links civic behaviour, public policy to social 
progress or decay. 
(Sauer 1997: 1184) 
 
The fact that all research is carried out within a particular cultural, social and 
political climate means that to some degree this inherent climate will have an 
extraneous influence both epistemologically and ontologically, on the overall 
research process and resultant findings. As Nixon et al. point out: ‘Educational 
research, like all educational activity, is politically driven and value saturated' 
(2003: 102). This point is also made by May who asserts: ‘Values do not simply 
affect some aspects of research, but all aspects’ (2001: 56). 
Christians endorses this observation when he states that: ‘Moral duty is nurtured 
by the demands of social linkage and not produced by abstract theory. The core of 
a society’s common morality is pretheoretical agreement’ (2000: 147). 
In his definition of ‘value’, which is quite extensive, Marshall goes on to note that 
on a philosophical level: 
the issues for sociology would seem to be twofold. First, since society itself 
is partially constituted through values, the study of sociology is in part the 
study of values. Second, since sociologists are themselves members of a 
society and presumably hold values (religious, political, and so forth), 
sociological work may become embroiled in matters of value – or even (as 
Marxists might put it) matters of ideology. Indeed, some have argued that, for 
this reason, sociologists may be incapable of value-neutrality expected of 
scientists more generally. 
(Marshall 1998: 690) 
 
We must also remember that the end use that research findings are put to (if any) 
may also be value laden. For this reason it is suggested by Marshall that 
‘sociologists should make the underlying debates explicit’ (1998: 690). 
12
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Pring refers to the importance of the influence of virtues, which he defines as: 
‘general dispositions to do the right thing at the right time’ (2001: 150). Pring 
reminds us that these virtues embody ‘the values which prevail in a social or 
cultural tradition’ (2001: 150). As a syllogism from these points, we can deduce 
that all researchers have virtues, and these will have been inherited from their 
social or cultural tradition. Pring sees the researcher as a person that ‘requires very 
special sorts of virtue, both moral and intellectual’ (2001: 151). Pring goes on to 
name some of these virtues: ‘the disposition to search for the truth’, ‘impartiality’, 
‘openness to criticism and co-operation’, ‘resistance to the blandishments or 
attractions which tempt one’, ‘courage’, ‘honesty’, ‘concern for the well-being of 
those who are being researched’, ‘modesty’, ‘humility’, ‘trust’, and the ‘ability to 
keep promises’ (2001: 151-152). Pring fully accepts the difficulties in ensuring 
that all researchers possess these qualities but states that such qualities and 
dispositions would seem to be essential for any researcher or would-be researcher. 
The aspect of the positionality of the researcher cannot be ignored. Each 
researcher has a position by virtue of their race, class, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, 
and so on. All of us to some degree wear ‘rose-tinted glasses’; the only question is 
really the extent of the tint. As Nixon et al. (2003: 102) exhort, that because of this 
positionality, researchers are required to exercise ‘deep and vigilant reflexivity’ 
and ensure that they are ‘attentive to the effects’ of their ‘own peripheral vision’. 
 
Some of the more contemporary approaches to educational research have come 
under attack from the more conventional schools of research on the grounds that 
their methodology and approach to research inherently contravenes some of the 
basic and fundamental principles of ethics. It is important therefore to look 
specifically at these nuances of approach within the field of educational research. 
 
4 Non-traditional methods of research 
 
A little sincerity is a dangerous thing, a great deal of it is absolutely 
fatal. 
(Oscar Wilde (1854-1900) Intentions) 
 
Recent nuances of approach to the method of data collection for research purposes 
have added significantly to the growing debate regarding research ethics. Covert 
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research, ethnographic studies and action research have all contributed to the 
question of what methods of data collection are ethically acceptable. Do some 
methods of data collection by their very nature contravene certain ethical 
principles? 
Marshall defines ‘covert observation’ thus: 
Participant observation carried out without the explicit awareness and 
agreement of the social unit being studied. This entails finding some self-
explanatory role within the research setting in order to mask the researcher’s 
true purpose. It may be used because research access to the social unit would 
normally be denied, or to ensure that the researcher’s presence does not affect 
the behaviour of those being observed. 
(Marshall 1998: 124-125) 
 
Scott and Usher explain the rationale behind covert research thus: ‘The principle 
behind this strategy is that participants in the research will behave unnaturally if 
they are aware that they are part of a research project’ (2003: 129). 
There are arguments against covert research and a tension between the public right 
to know and the protection of the individual's privacy and confidentiality. 
Guidelines need to be formulated for the use of secondary data where informed 
consent of the participants is obtained, even if retrospectively. 
Punch (1986) presents an argument that covert research in social science is 
justifiable in some circumstances. Ethical issues which he raises include the idea 
that some research areas are 'beyond the pale' as topics of social research. Although 
he gives some examples, Punch (1986) points out that there is no consensus in 
social science about what these areas might be and likens some kinds of social 
research to investigative journalism where an exposé of a practice or organization 
has some public benefit. 
Other writers on qualitative research argue for the centrality of a special relation 
between researcher and researched, and consequently reject covert research as an 
appropriate method. The perspective on covert research put forward by Punch 
(1986) seems to have little relevance for educational research, and is both explicitly 
and implicitly challenged in much of the other literature. 
In action research, persons conducting the research act as citizens attempting to 
influence the political process through collecting information. The goal is to 
promote social change that is consistent with the advocates' beliefs. Marshall 
confirms this interpretation in his definition and adds: ‘The research subjects are 
14
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invited to participate at various stages of a relatively fast-moving sequence of 
research-action-research-action’ (Marshall 1998: 4). This type of research is 
ultimately an iterative process with an end goal or specific solution to a problem as 
the ultimate objective. 
From the perspective of ethical principles, surely the objectivity of the researcher is 
questionable. By the very nature of this process, the researcher is intrinsically 
participating in all stages of the research and actively contributing to the outcome. 
Robson, openly accepts that action research ‘goes beyond the usual concerns for 
consent, confidentiality and respect for the participants’ interests’ (1997: 33). To 
compensate for this fact, Robson (1997) offers thirteen alternative ethical principles 
specifically for those engaged in this type of research. 
Ethnographic study is yet again, another research methodology, which, by its very 
nature, appears to contravene ethical research principles. This form of research is 
commonly linked with the research techniques of social anthropology and is often 
referred to as fieldwork. Marshall informs us in his definition of ethnography that: 
‘the principle technique of ethnographic research is participant observation’ (1998: 
202). The researcher effectively finds their way into a social milieu (by whatever 
means), and then proceeds to write up a report giving the ‘inside’ perspective of the 
group. Pring (2003), in his article entitled `The virtues and vices of an educational 
researcher', gives clear examples of the nature of ethnographic research. In 
describing this research methodology, Pring (2003) specifically draws our attention 
to the many dilemmas and dangers facing researchers carrying out this type of 
research. Pring states his objective from the outset, which he acknowledges, is to 
question ‘whether it is sufficient to think in terms of principles, codes and rules’ 
(2003: 52). Pring goes on to state that: ‘It may be more important, from an ethical 
point of view, to consider much more carefully the virtues of the researcher than 
the principles he or she espouses’ (2003: 52). 
His point is well noted, but this still brings us back to the difficulty of reconciling 
this type of research (and the other types noted above) with the tenets and 
principles of ethics that have been both adopted and are considered sacrosanct by 
many within the research community. Perhaps, by including too broad a range of 
activities under the rubric of research, we may be enlarging our definition to such a 
15
Gallagher: ethical issues
Published by ARROW@TU Dublin, 2005
Level3 – May 2005 – Issue 3 
© Greg Gallagher, Dublin Institute of Technology 
 
degree that it loses meaning. Called into question here is the traditional notion of 
the researcher as objective. 
As Eisenhart points out: 
some funding agencies, confused by the proliferation of qualitative methods 
and debates surrounding them, are poised to deny ethnographic research 
proposals -- along with other forms of qualitative research -- on the grounds 
that the methods are not `reliable and rigorous'. 
(Eisenhart 2001: 17) 
 
One of the ‘muddles’ confronting ethnography, according to Eisenhart, is how to 
reconcile this form of research ‘with both the conditions of postmodernity (the 
economic and social conditions of late 20th century capitalism) and postmodernist 
ideas about truth, knowledge, values, and ethics’ (2001: 17). 
 
Bearing these facts in mind let us now look at one of the key ethical resolving 
formulas, namely, the categorical imperative. 
 
5 The categorical imperative 
 
The conception of worth, that each person is an end per se, is not a 
mere abstraction. Our interest in it is not merely academic. Every 
outcry against the oppression of some people by other people, or 
against what is morally hideous is the affirmation of the principle 
that a human being as such is not to be violated. A human being is 
not to be handled as a tool but is to be respected and revered. 
(Felix Adler (1851-1933), The Ethical Philosophy of Life) 
 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) argued that when we are choosing how we should act 
under certain circumstances, we should apply criteria, which are capable of 
becoming universal principles. In other words, under comparable circumstances, 
other people could apply the same principles. Kant termed this approach to ethical 
problems the `categorical imperative'. Based on Kant's moral philosophy, 
individuals cannot be used as a means to an end. Kant points out that each person 
thinks of himself or herself as a rational creature that is entitled to dignity and 
respect. Consistency then requires that each person recognize the rational nature of 
other persons and thus recognize that other persons are also entitled to be treated 
with dignity and respect. This is why Kant argues that one cannot use another as a 
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means merely to an end. In yet another formulation of the categorical imperative 
Kant argues that in a community or organization we are bound by rules but by rules 
that we ourselves would accept as rational legislators. Thus in such communities, 
which Kant calls kingdoms of ends, the members are all equally subject and 
sovereign. 
This is, in effect, an ethics of respect for persons. In order to make sense of what is 
ethically permissible, it is necessary to point out that general ethics is theoretical, 
moral philosophy is practical and a code of ethics elucidatory. To paraphrase Evans 
and Jakupec (1996: 73): Research conduct is judged by the extent to which it is 
aligned to the moral agency recognizing the principle of respect of persons. It is not 
ethically permissible to violate participants’ self-purpose or self-determination. 
There are four questions to be asked of researchers' conduct to ascertain whether 
research is ethically permissible: 
 
1. Does the researcher treat the individual as self-conscious, autonomous, 
free and rational? 
2. Is the purpose of the research in the interests of the research participant? 
3. Could the research data and findings be used for other than the intended 
purposes and do the participants understand this possibility? 
4. Does the research potentially make the participant an instrument of the 
research and/or the researcher? 
 
Researchers in education need to be aware of the principles of free informed 
consent. Having made this point, May reminds us that this principle has inherent 
difficulties, specifically, concerning research on the Internet. He observes: 
Not only do the bounds between the public and private aspects of life have the 
potential to become somewhat blurred, but also in seeking consent from 
respondents from whom should this be obtained? When a group is ‘virtual’ 
and subject to routine changes in its composition this creates problems for 
those seeking to follow such a doctrine. 
(May 2001: 60) 
 
Where there are conflicts, which need to be settled, guidance is required from codes 
of ethics, from colleagues, and direction from our institutions in the form of 
policies, procedures and guidelines. 
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If we accept the importance and legitimacy of having rules and guidelines to assist 
the process of research, then we must accept that researchers to some degree must 
be held accountable for the methods they use and also to some degree, for the 
relevance of the research carried out in the first place. But how exactly can 
researchers be held accountable, and what constitutes relevance? 
 
6 Accountability and relevance 
 
Good people do not need laws to tell them to act responsibly, while 
bad people will find a way around the laws. 
Plato (c.429-347 BC) 
 
The many stakeholders involved in the process of educational research would tend 
to imply that researchers have many masters to whom they are ultimately 
accountable. Because of the impact that some educational research may have and 
by a process of extraction, society in general stands to benefit from any 
progressive advance that such research can uncover. As Winch reminds us, the 
overall objective that educational researchers are concerned with include: ‘pursuit 
of the truth, enduring worth, clarity and enlightenment, however these are 
conceived’ (2002: 152). 
Researchers are faced with both growing internal professional critics as well as 
external critics both influential and otherwise. Winch goes so far as to say that: ‘It 
is evident that educational research has powerful enemies, both within and without 
education, and that it can only defend itself if it develops a proper perspective on 
its own nature and purpose’ (2002: 153). While, this comment may appear 
paranoid, there may be some justification behind it. 
One of the many criticisms that some ethical approaches to educational research 
are accused of today is a failure to be ‘pragmatic’. Pragmatism is a school of 
philosophy, which is based very much on the work of William James and John 
Dewey. The essence of pragmatism is that purely theoretical analysis of 
philosophical problems is insufficient, and that it should be complemented by a 
very practical approach to issues. The pragmatist would laud the many schools of 
ethical thought and the principles behind their thinking. However, the pragmatist 
would not subscribe to any one school, indeed the pragmatist would warn against 
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the viewpoint that one school has a superior approach to ethics than another. No 
one school can have the answer to all of life’s ethical dilemmas and to adopt such 
a stance would be both erroneous and dangerous. Moral principles evolve and 
change, and such developments demand that a contingent and open ethical 
position be adopted based on codes, policies, procedures and guidelines. 
While relevance may be the desired outcome of any research undertaking, it is a 
difficult term to define. This point is endorsed by May who attempts to refine our 
understanding of what constitutes relevant research. He states: ‘It is usually taken 
as that which serves the ends of particular interests. In such cases, the social 
researcher should ask the questions ``relevant for whom and why?''' (May 2001: 
51). May goes on to advise us that we should bear three other factors in mind, 
namely, ‘culture, history and power’ (2001: 51). There are competing forces at 
work within these three factors and adherents to the different perspectives will 
view ‘relevance’ in different ways. 
Winch (2002), provides us with a number of headings under which we can 
adjudicate the degree of relevance that a particular piece of research has. These 
include: the production of knowledge about education, the formulation of 
educational policy, the promotion of improvements in educational practice, and 
the promotion of radical change in society. While Winch (2002) sees these 
pursuits as four clearly identifiable aims of educational research, and spends time 
explaining each one, he also points out that these are also the responsibilities of 
educational researchers, and outlines exactly what each responsibility entails. 
On the other hand, as Nixon and Sikes point out: ‘Educational research is 
grounded, epistemologically, in the moral foundations of educational practice. It is 
the epistemological and moral purposes underlying the ``usefulness'' and 
``relevance'' of educational research that matter’ (Nixon and Sikes 2003: 2). They 
make the valid point that ‘usefulness’ and ‘relevance’ are not just ‘a matter of 
impact and influence’. For Nixon and Sikes (2003: 2), we need to radically 
reconceptualize what is educationally worthwhile in what we deem to be ‘useful’ 
and ‘relevant’. 
 
There are those who see the current interest in ethics as a passing fad, a simple and 
superficial expression of a deeper crisis within the educational field, a 
consequence of the decline in ideology and religion, and the apparent failure of 
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philosophy to produce laws that will be universally acceptable, or as a knee jerk 
reaction to the failures of strong leadership and stable political climates. Others 
may view ethical imperatives as a way for researchers, and the institutions that 
they belong to, to reduce their exposure from both a legal and a social perspective. 
If the researcher goes outside the rules in the pursuit of truth and fails, then the 
institution can distance itself from the individual researcher. On the other hand, if 
the researcher succeeds then they can simply ignore the fact that a few rules were 
broken. Others may view the recent upsurge in interest in a more constructive 
light, as a combination of all these aspects, but also a search for truth and the 
genuine need for direction. A direction, which is both needed and practical and 
will assist and not hinder genuine researchers in their unrelenting attempts to 
uncover truth to assist our understanding of the world we live in. The profession of 
a genuine educational researcher is a noble one, and must be above any accusation 
of unethical behaviour. 
 
7 Conclusions 
 
Reason guides our attempt to understand the world about us. Both 
reason and compassion guide our efforts to apply that knowledge 
ethically, to understand other people, and have ethical relationships 
with other people. 
Molleen Matsumura, Church-State Activist and Outreach Director of 
the National Centre for Science Education (NCSE) 
 
It must be accepted that the society of today is replete with ethical lapses and 
moral ambiguity. Any attempt to resolve the inherent inconsistencies, obvious 
contradictions and cognitive conundrums that are pervasive within the minefield 
of ethical dilemmas researched for this paper would be a Herculean task beyond 
mere mortal ability and fraught with tautologies. For this reason, no definitive 
answers are proffered, as the author believes that no definitive answers are 
possible, merely prescriptive contingent discriminations to resolve the current 
impasse. To assist in this process allusion will be made to some of the conclusive 
points made by some of the authors already cited within this paper. 
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Eisenhart (2001) has no specific answers to the dilemmas confronted by 
ethnographers. In her final remarks she concludes: 
ethnographers will rarely, if ever, be in leadership positions. Instead, we will 
have to participate, along with others, with one perspective or voice among 
many. We will have to be clear about our own agendas and commitments. We 
will have to speak what we know and believe in, but we will also have to listen, 
deliberate, negotiate, and compromise around the knowledge and beliefs of 
others who are involved. Perhaps needs identified out of everyday experience, 
such as for adequate nutrition, medical care, or educational opportunity, should 
be the basis for intervention. Perhaps agreed-upon principles, such as justice or 
equality, should be the basis. Perhaps some combination of the two or some 
others. Specific plans for change will have to emerge from local deliberation 
and collaboration around the various possibilities. 
(Eisenhart 2001: 24) 
 
The point made by Christians tends to reinforce this very issue when he says that: 
‘Only a reintegration of autonomy and the moral order provides an alternative 
paradigm for the social sciences today’ (2000: 135). Perhaps, the very ethical 
principles that are currently so much in vogue are outdated and need to be 
reviewed in light of current circumstances and actual practices. 
As Punch observes: ‘a strict application of codes’ may ‘restrain and restrict’ a 
great deal of ‘innocuous’ and ‘unproblematic’ research (1994: 90). Punch goes on 
to say that encoding privacy protection is meaningless when ‘there is no consensus 
or unanimity on what is public and private’ (1994: 94). 
Christians asserts that: 
the moral task cannot be reduced to professional ethics. How the moral order 
works itself out in community formation is the issue, not first of all what 
practitioners consider virtuous. The challenge for those writing culture is not 
to limit their moral perspectives to their own codes of ethics, but to 
understand ethics and values in terms of everyday life. 
(Christians 2000: 147) 
 
 
Cohen et al. deduce that: 
However inexperienced in these [ethical] matters researchers are, they will 
bring to the world of social research a sense of rightness on which they can 
construct a set of rational principles appropriate to their own circumstances 
and based on personal, professional, and societal values. 
(Cohen et al. 2001: 71) 
 
Eisner and Peshkin remark that: 
Clearly, researchers need both cases and principles from which to learn about 
ethical behaviour. More than this, they need two attributes: the sensitivity to 
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identify an ethical issue and the responsibility to feel committed to acting 
appropriately in regard to such issues. 
(Eisner and Peshkin 1990: 244) 
 
Gomm exposes that: 
the difference between researchers adopting a value-neutral policy towards 
research and those who adopt a politically committed position underlies 
important differences in interpretation of what is ethical conduct for 
researchers. 
(Gomm 2004: 321) 
 
May warns that: 
Overall, rigid and inflexible sets of ethical rules for social research 
(deontology) could leave us with undesirable consequences. Going so far 
down this ethical road, we might also conclude that the only safe way to 
avoid violating principles of professional ethics is to refrain from doing 
social research altogether. 
(May 2001: 61) 
 
Pring attests that: 
the values of a democratic community would seem to be essential for the 
tradition of educational research which serves the many interested parties and 
which can give assurance that, through openness to criticism, it will at least 
approximate to the truth. 
(Pring 2001: 155) 
 
Smith rationalizes that: 
The core of the resolution of value conflicts is to treat the values as 
dimensional concepts and ask oneself how much of one value one is willing 
to give up for how much of another value. And that is a very difficult 
intellectual process in complex practical situations. 
(Smith 1990: 274) 
 
Soltis expounds that: 
Whether codes of proper professional conduct are made explicit or remain 
implicitly embedded in the practices of the group to which one belongs is not 
the point, even though making such norms explicit may be desirable. The 
point is that membership in a professional community carries with it binding 
collective obligations and forces us to view ethics from a shared perspective. 
(Soltis 1990: 250) 
 
It must be fully accepted that the more contemporary approaches to educational 
research do not meet all the principles or guidelines that have been the ethical 
tenets used by the profession to date. However, it must also be stated that these 
approaches have added to our knowledge within this field and in the majority of 
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cases no actual harm has been caused as a direct result of the process. This being 
said we effectively have choices. We can outlaw these approaches on the grounds 
that they contravene certain ethical principles. We can adopt the principles to 
incorporate these new approaches. We can give a dispensation to these new 
approaches, which will allow them to continue, but with a clear conscience, or we 
can avoid taking any action and hope the problem goes away. Obviously the latter 
solution is not a real solution but appears to be the main stance adopted by many 
institutions that have not attempted to reconcile the current dilemma. Perhaps 
some combination of the first three solutions might be a more plausible approach 
and would ensure that all the vested parties directly affected by any resolution 
could be appeased. Care must be taken to ensure that any constraint placed on the 
researcher will not be unduly onerous or impede the functionality of their 
undertakings. Flexibility would have to be a key factor in the negotiation of any 
universal approach to resolving the current impasse. 
As stated earlier, perhaps it is impossible to realistically resolve all of the dilemmas 
that the problems with these conventional approaches to research present. However, 
the noble nature of the profession alluded to earlier and all those entrusted with its 
governance owe a duty of care to those working in this field and the general public 
who are guided by their wisdom to resolve this current impasse and restore full 
confidence in all research methodologies being practised by its agents. 
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